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1. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a fundamental In-
ternet infrastructure, which resolves billions of queries per
day in support of global communications and commerce.
The most common use of DNS is to map human-friendly
domain names to machine-readable IP addresses.The DNS
is designed based on the client-server model where stub re-
solver at the client side originates DNS query for some query
name and authoritative server at the server side responses
with the requested mapping associated with the query name.
To simplify client and enhance the scalability and efficiency
of name resolution, stub resolver commonly relies on recur-
sive resolver to traverse the DNS tree and return final an-
swer. The DNS is known to be susceptible to cache poi-
soning and man-in-the-middle attacks, so the major efforts
devoted to securing DNS in the past two decades focused on
ensuring source authentication and data integrity (such as
the DNSSEC initiatives), which are essential for the com-
mon use of DNS. As the DNS is taken for granted an in-
dispensable service for almost every Internet end user, it is
also convenient for malicious use. An emerging misuse of
DNS in recent years is DNS tunnel. Unlike the common use
of DNS which aims at finding the mapping data associated
with the interested query name, the goal of DNS tunnel is to
use DNS as a communication stack between the querier and
the responder. A DNS tunnel can be used for “command
and control”, data exfiltration or tunneling of any internet
protocol (IP) traffic.
There are a variety of services that leverage DNS tun-
nel to convey specific information about their users to their
providers.For example, Sophos [5] designs and maintains a
protocol/framework to encode generic information about the
threat and the detection, which is based on DNS transaction.
When a Sophos-enabled endpoint triggers a detection by a
scanner and needs to look up the security services, it requests
the sophosxl.net name servers using a specially crafted DNS
query. The domain in the DNS query is generated to include
all necessary information about the suspicious file. Then the
endpoint adjust its behavior according to the information
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encoded in the DNS response. Some other anti-virus soft-
ware vendors also have similar services or systems. McAfee
[3] provides a reputation system through the DNS channel.
When a suspicious file is found by the McAfee software, a
query can be generated with a fingerprint and other informa-
tion and sent to the McAfee server. And the McAfee server
encodes the reputation in the response. The response could
be an address from 127.0.0.0/16 indicating a specific code
of reputation or NXDOMAIN indicating that the file is not
known to hold malicious content. Those uses of DNS tun-
nel are generally considered as benign since they basically
intend to serve the users rather than jeopardize them.
Recent years also witness the increasingly prevalent ma-
licious use of DNS tunnel. In a 2012 presentation at the
RSA conference, Ed Skoudis [4] identified that DNS based
Command and Control of malware as one of the six most
dangerous new attacks. Ed shared that “Attackers have re-
cently used this technique in cases involving the theft of
millions of accounts”. It has been shown that DNS tunnel-
ing can achieve bandwidth of 110 KB/s with latency of 150
ms [1].A recent example of malicious use of DNS tunnel is
a new variant of a point of sale (POS) malware family [2]
which exfiltrates stolen payment card data over DNS. That
malware, once executed on the targeted host, will collect
sensitive information with user information and card data
included, encode them with a custom Base32 encoding algo-
rithm, and then makes a DNS query with this information
to a hardcoded domain. The attacker will be thus by noti-
fied with data which typically is sufficient in most scenarios
to attempt card fraud.
Given the growing threats posed by malicious use of DNS
tunnel, the defense is still unfortunately scarce by now. The
reason is basically of two fold. One is caused by the fact that
DNS traffic is often not monitored, restricted nor blocked
unless it potentially amounts to a DoS or DDoS like dev-
astating level. It is widely believed that DNS should be
universally available to anyone who would like to use it.
Therefore when malicious communication on e.g., HTTP or
FTP by attackers are subject to defensive monitoring and
blocking especially in sensitive environments, DNS tunnel
is often unlikely to be disabled by blocking. The other is
caused by the fact that benign and malicious use of DNS
tunnel co-exist and no effective way of differentiating them
is available. Once a DNS tunnel is detected, simply blocking
it risks disabling a benign use of it and simply allowing it
risks enabling a malicious use of it.
This paper proposes a defense scheme against malicious
use of DNS tunnel. A tunnel validator is designed to pro-
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Figure 1: The defense scheme against malicious use
of DNS tunnel.
vide trustworthy tunnel-aware defensive recursive service.
In addition to the detection algorithm of malicious tunnel
domains, the tunnel validation relies on registered tunnel do-
mains as whitelist and identified malicious tunnel domains
as blacklist. A benign tunnel user is thus motivated to reg-
ister its tunnel domain before using it. Through the tunnel
validation, the secure domains are allowed to the recursive
service provided by the tunnel validator and the insecure
domains are blocked. All inbound suspicious DNS queries
are recorded and stored for forensics and future malicious
tunnel detection by the tunnel validator.
2. THE DEFENSE SCHEME
2.1 The User End
A stub resolver installed on the host originates a DNS
query for a tunnel domain. Note that the host, if com-
promised by the attacker, is unlikely to perform any tun-
nel detection or filtering before a malicious insecure domain
is requested. So the suspicious insecure domains are more
likely to be identified by the firewall. The tunnel detection
algorithm implemented by the firewall relies on the payload
analysis of the DNS message with the following techniques:
• Query name length. Compared with other alterna-
tive protocols, DNS message is very limited in size for tunnel
utilities.For example, to make full use of DNS message, an
attacker would place as much as possible data into an en-
coded query name to maximum the data transfer rate over
DNS. So a tunnel query name has a good chance to have
long labels of up to 63 characters and long overall length of
up to 255 characters.
• Query name entropy. Common use of DNS often has
query name with dictionary words or something that looks
meaningful.By contrast,tunnel query names generally have
a higher entropy and a more even use of the character set.
More accurately, a set of features such as the maximum,
minimum, average, median, and variance of the entropy of
labels within a query name can be calculated as an indicator
of tunnel query names.
• Statistical analysis. The statistical characteristics of
the characters within a query name provides another means
of detect tunneling.Common query names tend to have few
numbers whereas tunnel query names may have more num-
bers.Other statistical characteristics include the percentage
of the length of the Longest Meaningful Substring (LMS),
the number of unique characters, etc.
To further detect the suspicious insecure domains from
the suspicious tunnel domains, we need to employ the re-
sponse features. Most malicious use of DNS tunnel care
little about responding, because all necessary information
needed by attackers are completely encoded in the tunnel
domains unidirectionally delivered from the users to the at-
tackers. To simplify the responding to diversely distributed
query names, the attackers often provide uniform responses
to the tunnel domains. The uniform responses include NX-
DOMAIN, NODATA, constant answers featured by wild-
card responses, SERVFAIL, and even no response at all. So
if the suspicious tunnel domains below a domain are always
uniformly responded, that domain has a good chance of be-
ing malicious tunnel domain and thus may be identified as
suspicious insecure domain.
Based on the detection of suspicious insecure domains, the
firewall forwards the queries for suspicious insecure domains
to the tunnel validating recursive resolver and the remaining
queries to the normal recursive resolver.
2.2 The Tunnel Validator
The tunnel validator is designed to identify the insecure
query domains and block their queries and at the same time
provide recursive service to the queries for secure query do-
mains.
If identified as secure, the query domain has its query
served by the tunnel validating recursive resolver. That is,
the queries hitting the cache may be responded immediately
from the cache, and only the cache missed queries have to
be forwarded to the authoritative server. If identified as
insecure, the query domain may its query blocked by the
tunnel validating recursive resolver. The possible blocking
policy may include a NXDOMAIN or SERVFAIL response
or no response at all.
As the core function of the tunnel validator, the classifi-
cation between malicious tunnel domains and benign tunnel
domains is based on three mechanisms:
• Tunnel domain registration. The service provider,
who desires to use DNS tunnel by generating encoded do-
mains and issuing queries for them, should register its in-
tended domain for DNS tunnel and the pattern of generat-
ing tunnel domains with the DNS tunnel registry. The DNS
tunnel registry may be hosted by the tunnel validator or the
third party which allows access to the shared registration
system (SRS) from the tunnel validator. When handling
the inbound queries, the tunnel validator should look up the
query domains from the SRS of the DNS tunnel registry.
Any query domain which hits an entry of the SRS and sat-
isfies its pattern defined by the DNS tunnel register should
be classified as secure. So the registered tunnel domains
function as whitelist.
• Malicious domain registration. The malicious do-
mains identified by the outside parties may be submitted to
and used by the tunnel validator. Another source of known
malicious domains is from the history of classification per-
formed by the tunnel validator itself. Any query domain
falling into the maintained malicious domains should be clas-
sified as insecure. So the registered tunnel domains function
as blacklist.
• Detection algorithm of malicious tunnel domain.
For those domains not covered by whitelisting and black-
listing, the tunnel validator implements detection algorithm
of malicious tunnel domain. The detection algorithm may
apply the payload analysis of the DNS message as well as
the inspection of responses. The techniques used by the de-
tection algorithm may be similar to those by the firewall
discussed above. Moreover, the caching performed by the
tunnel validating recursive resolver enables another detec-
tion method against the malicious use of DNS tunnel. If the
tunnel validator is heavily and widely relied on by the user
end systems, an abundant amount of secure domains and in-
secure domains will be possessed and cached by the tunnel
validating recursive resolver. Given that secure domains are
likely to have a high cache hit rate and insecure domain are
likely to have a low cache hit rate (largely because they are
mostly used once), a domain hitting cache should be rated
with a better chance of a secure domain.
The tunnel validator should record and keep the log files
of the inbound and outbound DNS queries or at least those
of the outbound DNS queries. In case of false negatives,
the outbound queries containing malicious tunnel domains
are falsely forwarded by the tunnel validating recursive re-
solver to the authoritative servers in control of the attackers.
Thus the log files of the outbound DNS queries may facili-
tate forensics against the malicious use of DNS tunnel.
2.3 The Tunnel Domain Register
The benign DNS tunnel users are highly motivated to
register their intended tunnel domains because those do-
mains may be otherwise blocked by the tunnel validator.
For those malicious DNS tunnel users who may also at-
tempt to register their intended malicious tunnel domains,
they are both regulated by the agreement of tunnel regis-
tration and restricted by the dedicated forensics enabled by
logging. While the encoded information in the malicious
tunnel domains are usually stealthy against monitoring and
censoring, the source and the target of tunneled information
are hardly stealthy. So the attackers residing at the au-
thoritative side, if misbehaves using their registered tunnel
domains, can be traced from the logging and addressed tech-
nically and legally. One technical response to a confirmed
malicious registered domain is to invalidate it from the SRS
and add it to the blacklist of malicious domains.
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